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Bush: Parental Notification

COMMENTS
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION: A
STATE-CREATED OBSTACLE TO
A MINOR WOMAN'S RIGHT OF
PRIVACY
The level of sexual activity of minors has risen and
continues to rise. The number of teenage pregnancies has also
risen and it is estimated that if this trend continues, four out of
every ten minor women will become pregnant at least once. 1
Abortion has become a major means by which minor women are
preventing unwanted pregnancies, but access to abortions for
minor women has become increasingly controversial. The issue
of whether or not parents should be informed of their daughter's
abortion decision has recently received attention from both the
courts and legislatures.
A woman's freedom to decide whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy has been protected as a fundamental right of
privacy. I This important right has also been extended to minor
women. S Traditionally, minors have been more restricted than
1. It is estimated that the proportion of all minor women who have ever been
premaritally pregnant rose from 9% in 1971 to 13% in 1976 to 16% in 1979. Some
12,000,000 teenagers are sexually active resulting in approximately 1,000,000 teenage
pregnancies per year. Meyers, Are Minors Entitled to Medical PrilJacy? 10 STUDENT
LAWYER 19 (1981); Zelnick & Kanter, Sexual ActilJity, ContraceptilJe Use and
Pregnancy Among Metropolitan-Area Teenagers: 1971-1979, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 230
(1980).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court in Roe held that the right of privacy
included a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy. For further discussion
of Roe, see infra note 43.
3. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Court decided that a
state did not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute veto over
a minor woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. For further discussion of
Danforth, see infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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adults in their rights and activities.· Restrictions have been
grounded in the belief that minors lack the maturity and
capacity necessary to understand the consequences of their
actions and to make decisions. a The constitutional rights of
minors have, therefore, been limited because of this traditional
viewpoint.'
The Supreme Court has never equated minors'
constitutional rights with those of adults. It has extended due
process rights to minors, but has not interpreted the due process
clause to provide constitutional protections equal to those of
4. It was believed necessary to limit the freedom of minors because they were "in a
state to require being taken care of by others, [and) must be protected against their own
actions as well as against external injury." J. MILL, ON LumRTY 11 (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
This attitude towards minors is reflected in the numerous ways in which their activities
and rights are restricted. California statutory restrictions are typical of those found in
other jurisdictions. Minors may not contract freely. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 34, 35 (West
Supp. 1980). Minors are restricted in work by child labor laws. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§
1290, 1292·1294 (West 1971). They may not marry without parental consent. See CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 4101,4201 (West Supp. 1980). They may not vote. See CAL. Euc. CODE §
17 (West 1977).
5. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1970), in which the Court recognizes that the
freedom of minors may be limited:
[T]he Court has held that the States validly may limit the
freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of
important, affirmative choices with potentially serious
consequences. These rulings have been grounded in the
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them.
Jd. at 635 (footnote omitted); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), in
which the Court distinguishes between the rights of adulta and those of children or
minors:
[A]t least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like
someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full
capacity for individual choice . . . . It is only upon such a
premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right
to vote-<ieprivations that would be constitutionally
intolerable for adults.
Jd. at 649·50 (footnotes omitted). See also Hafen, Children', Liberation and the New
Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976
B.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (asserting that too much freedom for minors would undermine the
preparatory role of the family which is a prerequisite to the existence of a rational and
productive individual).
6. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding right of Amish parents to
refuse to send their children to high school); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (parents have right to choose their children's education).
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adults. 'I Minor women do have the constitutional right to decide
whether to bear a child,8 but the states have greater latitude in
regulating that right with respect to minors than they do with
adults. 8 The Court has also traditionally upheld the parents'
right to direct freely their children's upbringing and education. lo
The constitutionality of parental notification statutes is yet
to be decided. The issue was addressed by the ·Court in H.L. v.
Matheson. l l However, the Court failed to decide conclusively
the constitutionality of parental notification requirements
because the holding was very narrow and only applied to minor
women who are not mature enough to make an abortion
decision. II This issue needs to be resolved as a number of states
have attempted to limit a minor woman's access to abortion. I I
7. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring due process protections before
suspension from school); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (providing certain rights in
juvenile court hearings).
8. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1967).
9. The Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) and Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1970), indicated that a state may constitutionally require some
parental involvement in a minor woman's abortion decision.
10. See cases cited supra note 6.
11. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
12. Id. at 411. The Court held that immature minors often lack the ability to make
informed choices that take into account immediate and long· range consequences;
therefore, a state may determine t}iat parental consultation is desirable.
13. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81·54 (Smith·Hurd Supp. 1981·1982) which
provides in part:
No abortion shall be performed in this state if the woman is
under 18 years of age and has not married except:
(3) After the consent of her parents is secured and
certified in writing.
If one of the parents has died, has deserted his or her
family, or is not available, consent by the remaining parent is
sufficient. If both parents have died, have deserted their
family or are not available, consent of the minor's guardian or
other person standing in loco parentis is sufficient.
If such consent is refused or cannot be obtained, consent
may be obtained by order of a judge of the circuit court upon
a finding, after such hearing as the judge deems necessary,
that the pregnant minor fully understands the consequences
of an abortion to her and her unborn child .... Notice of such
hearing shall be sent to the parents of the minor at their last
known address . . . .
The Illinois statute does not permit a minor woman to enter the courts directly to
obtain permission for an abortion. It is similar to the statute struck down in Bellotti
which held that "every minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to go
directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents." Bellotti v. Baird,
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Additionally, there have been congressional attempts to qualify
a minor woman's access to abortion. I' Because the issue of
parental notification remains unresolved, minor women cannot
be assured of the right to choose an abortion even when abortion
may be their only choice. Dramatic increases in teenage
pregnancies evidence the need for greater access to and
information about abortion. This Comment argues that parental
notification statutes unduly burden a minor woman's right of
privacy as they impose a state-created obstacle to minor women
who wish to exercise their right to have an abortion. This right
means very little if state regulations or restrictions make access
to abortions difficult or impossible. The interests that such
regulations seek to protect - the health of the minor and the
parent-child relations - are not served by parental notification.
The health consequences for minor women who bear children
are severe and the psychological health of minor women can be
detrimentally affected by requiring parental notice.1&
This Comment concludes that the only interests served by
parental notification statutes are those of groups opposed to
abortion. Since 1973, when the Court held in Roe v. Wade l l that
a woman has a fundamental right to decide whether or not to
bear a child, groups opposed to abortion have sought to overturn

u.s.

443
622, 647 (1970). The Illinois parental consent requirement was held
unconstitutional (as violative of equal protection for under inclusiveness in excluding
married minors and over inclusive in including married, emanicapted minors) in Wynn v.
Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978). For other state statutes which require either
consent or notification see: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.35.5 (found unconstitutional
under Bellotti v. Baird in Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980»
(amended 1980) (West Supp. 1982); 1981 Minn. Seas. Law Serv. ch. 228 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 144.343) (West Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. I 188.028 (Vernon Supp.
1982) (held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D.
Mo. 1980»; NEB. REv. STAT. § 28·347 (Supp. 1981); NBV. REv. STAT. § 442.255 (1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14·02.103 (1980) (held unconstitutional in Leigh v. Olsen, 497 F.
Supp. 1340 (D. N.D. 1980» (amended 1981) (Interim Supp. 1981).
14. S. 158, S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONGo REc. 11,528·29 (daily ed. Oct.
15, 1981) (the Human Life Statute) (declares that human life begins at conception and
would extend the same legal protections to the unborn that apply to all persons); S.J.
Res. 110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Human Life Federaliam Amendment) (would
authorize Congress and the states to regulate or prohibit abortion). See also S. 1808,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Family Protection Act) (would have required parental
notification for those contraception and abortion programs seeking federal funding).
15. Women under the age of 20 have a higher rate of maternal complications. ALAN
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, TEENAGE PREGNANCY: THE PROBLEM THAT HASN'T GONE AWAY
(1981) [hereinafter cited as TEENAGE PREGNANCY).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For further discussion of Roe see infra note 43.
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this decision. 17 These efforts, until recently, have been
unsuccessful as the Court has struck down regulations which
place an undue burden on a woman's right to privacy.18 In 1980,
however, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde
Amendment which drastically limits funding for abortion. Ie
There are many complex reasons for opposition to abortion, but
opposition has focused on overturning Roe, or limiting access to
abortion. 1o Requiring parental notice will in effect limit access to
an abortion for minor women and serve the interests of those
opposed to abortion.
17. Donovan, Half a Loaf: A New Antiabortion Strategy, 13 FAY. PLAN. PERSP. 262
(1981). The author discussea the current antiabortion legislation which attempts to
ovenide the Court's decision in Roe:
Since 1973, when the Supreme Court held that the
constitutional right to privacy included a woman's decision to
have an abortion, there have been three basic types of
constitutional amendments introduced in Congreaa: the
human life amendment, which would bar abortions except to
Bave the pregnant woman's life; the "paramount" human life
amendment, which would impose an absolute ban on abortion
with no exceptions; and a states' rights amendment, which
would allow states to establish their own abortion policies, 88
they did before 1973.
18. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (determination of viability is for
the judgment of an attending physician; state cannot determine viability without
allowing for judgment of physician); Mahoning Women's Center v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456
(6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 447 U.S. 918 (1979) (ordinances which impose a series of costly
medical and building code regulations on abortion facilities are unconstitutional);
Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 941 (1978) (statute
requiring a woman to be informed that an infant born alive during an attempted
abortion is a ward of state is unconstitutional); Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th
Cir. 1976) (state cannot enact legislation which has the etrect of establishing a
presumption of viability of the fetus prior to 24 weeks); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp.
1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (state cannot require that a woman be informed of fetal
development prior to abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554
(E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd Bub nom., Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976) (state cannot
require written consent of spouse).
19. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 291 (1980). The Hyde Amendment refers to funding
restrictions adopted by Congress barring the use of federal funds for reimbursement of
abortion costs under the Medicaid program. For further discussion of the funding issue,
see generally Note, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers: Procreative
Choice Guaranteed for All Women, infra page 691.
20. The right-to-life movement is at a critical point in its crusade to
prohibit abortion. With an administration publicly committed to
outlawing abortion, antiabortion senators 88 chairmen of key
committees, and many abortion opponents newly elected to the
House and Senate, the year [l981} began with the widespread
expectation that Congreaa would take some action to override the
Supreme Court's 1973 decisions legalizing abortion.
Donovan, supra note 17, at 262.
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TEENAGE

Parental notification must be considered in the context of
increasing teenage sexual activity and pregnancies. II While the
level of sexual activity and pregnancy has risen, efforts by minor
women to avoid pregnancy and childbirth have intensified.I I Minor women have increased their efforts to avoid pregnancy by
increasing the use of contraceptives.1I Because they are not using the most effective methods of birth control, the pregnancy
rate has continued to climb. If Abortion has, therefore, become a
major means by which minor women prevent unwanted births."
Abortions are sought by minor women because of the
weighty and often adverse consequences of having a child. These
range from interruption of the woman's education to early and
unstable marriages. Ie Economic effects of childbirth can be par21. See 8upra note 1 and accompanying text.
22. Zelnick & Kanter, 8upra note I, at 237. The authon found that minors were
trying harder than ever to avoid pregnancy and childbirth.
23. Id. The percentage of premarita1ly sexually active women aged 15-19 who ever
experienced a premarital pregnancy and never used contraceptives declined from 58.8%
in 1976 to 50.3% in 1979. Id.
24. Id. Use of birth control pills declined 16% between 1976 and 1979. Use by finttime contraceptive users declined from 32.8% to 19.4%, whereas use of diaphragms,
rhythm and withdrawal methods increased. The authors speculate that the declining use
of the pill, especially with first-time contraceptive users, increased the prevalence of first
pregnancies.
25. In 1973,246,000 abortions were obtained by women 19 or younger. By 1978, the
number almost doubled to 434,000. Women aged 15-19 terminated two-fifths of their
pregnancies by abortion. The availability of abortion has led to better contraceptive use
rather than a relaxation of contraceptive use. There is evidence that teenagers practice
contraception much more effectively after they have had abortions. TuNAGB PREGNANCY,
8upra note 15, at 52-53. Because of early age of initiation of intercourse and the aasociated nonuse of contraceptives, half of all premarital teenage pregnancies occur in the
first six months after the minors become sexually active; one-fifth occur in the first
month. Zabin, Kanter, & Aelnick, The Risk of Adolescent Pregnancy in the First
Months of Intercour8e, 11 FAY. PLAN. PBRSP. 215 (1979).
26. See Balwin & Cain, The Children of Teenage Parents, 12 FAN. PLAN. PBRSP. 34
(1980). The authors found that children born to teenagers suffer intellectually, largely
because of the economic and social impact of early childbearing on the young parents.
Such children are more likely to spend part of their childhood in one-parent households
and have children themselves while adolescents. Card & Wille, Teenage Mothers and
Teenage Fathers: The Impact of Early Childbearing on the Parents' Per80nal and Profe88ional LiIJes, 10 FAN. PLAN. PBRSP. 199 (1978). The younger the parent at the birth of
a child, the greater their educational setback. Young parents are more likely to hold lowprestige jobs because they do not complete as many years of school. Furstenburg, The
Social Consequences of Teenage Parenthood, 8 FAY. PLAN. PBRSP. 148 (1976).

Women's Law Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/3

6

Bush: Parental Notification

1982]

PARENTAL NOTIFICATION

585

ticularly severe when a minor woman drops out of high school
and attempts to support herself and a child." Health consequences for minor women who bear children can also be harsh.
Maternal mortality and non-fatal maternal complications such
as toxemia, anemia and complications from premature births are
higher with women under twenty than with adult women. Ie Access to an abortion is therefore a vital option for pregnant minor
women faced with such consequences. Access to an abortion free
from parental interference can be just as vital. For some minor
women, parental notification will prevent them from obtaining
an abortion.·e
Many minor women, especially the very young, do consult
their parents about their decision to have an abortion. so Younger
women are far more likely to tell their parents of their decision,
Three out of five premaritally pregnant mothers aged 17 and younger were separated or divorced within eis years after they married. One-fifth of the marriages were
di880lved within 12 monthe. Minor women 17 or younger are three times more likely, and
their husbands twice as likely, to eplit up with their spouses than those who marry in
their 20's. ALAN GlJTI'WACHBR INSTlTtITK, U Mn.uON 'rBBNAGBRS: WHAT CAN BE DONE
ABoUT THE EPmunc or AooLBSCENT PitBGNANCIBS IN THE UNITBD STATES?, 28 (1976)
(hereinafter cited 88 11 Mn.uON TaNAGBRSJ.
?:l. See Moore, TeeMle Childbirth and Welfare Dependency, 10 FAM. PLAN. PBRSP.
233 (1978). The author of this two-year study of teenage mothers concludes that a woIJIIlD who bears a child during her teens is much more likely to be forced to support
herself and her children on a low income or to become dependent on welfare asaistance
than the woman who postpones childbearing. There are approximately 600,000 families
with children five years old or younger headed by mothers aged 14-25. Two-thirds of
these families are living below the poverty level. TaNAGB PRBGNANCY, .upra note 15, at
33.
28. The maternal death rate for 1977-78 among women under age 15 was 18 per
100,000 live births. Non-fatal complications were higher for teenage mothers. They are
15% more likely to have anemia and 23% more likely to suffer from complications of
premature birth than are mothers who gave birth at ages 20-24. TEENAGE PREGNANCY,
supra note 15, at 29.
29. See infra notes 34 and 35 and accompanYing text.
30. Torres, Forrest & Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use
of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PBRsp. 284 (1980). The authors surveyed 2,540 family planning agencies that administered 5,000 clinics and 2,100
hospitals which provide abortion services, inquiring about policies and practices concerning parental notification and consent. They also surveyed 2,400 patients under the age of
18 who obtained contraceptives and abortions at these facilities to determine whose parents knew they were being provided these services. The study showed that 55% of those
surveyed aaid their parents knew they were obtaining an abortion. Thirty-eight percent
told their parents voluntarily; 13% aaid their parents suggested an abortion, 2% said
their parents found out from a relative or friend and 2% reported that the clinic required them to tell their parents or informed their parents directly. Fifty-four percent of
the abortion patients aaid they had diacussed their decision with their parents. [d. at
288.
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and their parents are more likely to refer them for an abortion. al
However, many minor women do not consult their parents and
do not wish to have their parents notified of their abortion decision. 83 For some, it is a matter of personal autonomy and a desire for minimal parental intervention. aa For many, parental intervention could result in an undesired marriage, expulsion from
home, or continuance of the pregnancy as a punishment for sexual activity.s4 Other minor women could be exposed to physical
or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support or, at the
very least, parental pressure causing great emotional distress."
Such consequences do not occur in all cases, especially because
many minor women do consult their parents and receive support
in making their decision. ae Parental interference and displeasure
tends to be more frequent and pronounced where parents cannot
accept their daughter's sexual maturity and activity or where
parents have very strong feelings regarding abortion. a7
A minor woman's interest in obtaining an abortion free of
parental notice is great, especially when notification would pre31. Seventy-two percent of those minor women 15 or younger discussed their decision to obtain an abortion with their parents. rd.
32. Forty-six percent of those surveyed said that their parents did not know of their
decision. rd.
33. Note, Parental Notification as a Prerequisite for Minors' Access to Contraceptives: A Behavioral and Legal Analysis, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 196, 203 (1979).
34. The Court recognized in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth that conflict can exist
in a family when a minor woman is pregnant. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). It also noted in
Bellotti II that "many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and young
pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their access to court." Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 647 (1970).
Many adults are also disturbed by the idea of adolescent sexuality, and "they advocate 'punishing' adolescents for their sexual activity in the hope that having bome an
out-of-wedlock child, faced eductional disruption, and/or having undergone a painful
premature pregnancy, the teenager will be persuaded to stop having sexual relations." 11
MILLION TEENAGERS, supra note 26, at 56. Continuance of pregnancy as punishment and
forced marriage were also seen as possibilities of parental interference by lower courts.
See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1388 n.24 (7th Cir. 1978); Women's Community
Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 560 (D. Me. 1979).
35. In Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, the district court also noted
as possible results of parental notification, parental pressure which in some cases would
result in great emotional distress, physical and psychological risks to the minor woman,
and delay on the part of the woman in seeking assistance with her pregnancy which
would increase the hazards of an abortion if she chose to obtain one. 477 F. Supp_ 542,
550 (D. Me. 1979). See also supra note 34.
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 34 and 35.
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vent an abortion. The effects of requiring parental notification
can be dramatic. One study on the probable impact of parental
notification estimates that 19,000 minor women would resort to
self-induced or illegal abortions and that 18,000 more minor women would bear unwanted children, were parental notification
required. '8 In addition, another 5,000 minors would run away
from home either to have the unwanted child or to obtain an
illegal abortion.·e If the minor woman gives birth as a result of
parental pressure, there are increased health risks to the child.
For example, the infant death rate is higher for children born to
women under twentyf° and minor women are far more likely to
have premature, or low-birth-weight babies. u
The impact on the health of the mother and child, the social
and economic consequences, and the emotional and physical
abuse affect not only minor women. The increase in illegal abortions, unwanted children, and physically abused minors is felt
by society as a whole."
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF A MINOR WOMAN'S RIGHT OF

PRIVACY
A woman's freedom to decide whether or not to conceive or
bear a child is a fundamental right which has recently been rec38. Zelnick & Kanter, supra note 1 at 291. In 1978, 184,000 teenagers aged 17 and
younger obtained abortions. The authors applied the results of their survey to this statistic and found that, if parental notification were required of all abortion providers, an
additional 39,000 minor women might inform their parents. But a higher number, 42,000,
would not obtain a legal abortion. Baeed on their findings, the authors conclude that
19,000 minor women could be expected to attempt to obtain an illegal abortion, another
18,000 would have an unwanted birth and another 5,000 would run away from home,
either to have the unwanted birth or to obtain an abortion.
39.Id.
40. Babies born to minor women are far more likely to die in the first year of life
than those born to mothers over the age of twenty. The risk of death is approximately 2
times higher than that of babies born to mothers over 20, and greater than that of infants born to mothers aged 40 or older-a high-risk age-group. The number of infant
deaths per 1,000 live births is 20.7 for women under 20, 13.2 for women 20-24, 10.7 for
women 25-29 and 14.8 for women over 40. TEENAGE PREGNANCY, supra note 15, at 29.
41. Id. This risk is 39% higher for babies born to minor women than for babies born
to women over 20.
42. The projected cost to society has not been statistically assessed as yet, but minor
women will become economically dependent upon state and federal services as the number of unwanted births increase and as more minor women do not finish high school.
These results cannot fail to have an etrect on society as a whole.
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ognized by the Court. U In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,"
the right to decide whether or not to bear a child was extended
to minor women. A state statutory provision requiring written
parental consent before a physician could perform an abortion
on a minor woman was invalidated by the Court. The Court reasoned that:
[T]he state does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's
pregnancy ....
Constitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.·'
The Court also recognized that a state has broader authority to
regulate the activities of minor women than it has in regulating
those of adult women.·' However, the Court stated that before
43. The right of privacy was recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). In reviewing a state statute prohibiting access to contraceptives, the Court emphasized the privacy of the marital relationship to support its finding the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 485-86. The right of privacy, according to Justice Douglas, originated
from those protections afforded by the third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. Id. at

484.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court employed the equal protection'
clause of the fourteenth amendment to extend to single women the same right of access
to contraceptives. Justice Brennan stated that "[i)f the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the indilJid,ud, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govemmental intrusion into matters 80 fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." rd. at 453 (emphasis in original).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), established the right of privacy as a fundamental
right. Such a right is a protected personal liberty under the fourteenth amendment aDd
includes decisions concerning family relationshipe, procreation, contraception, child rearing and education. Id. at 152-53. The Roe court struck down a statute which outlawed
abortions except those necessary to aave the mother's life. The Court stated the right of
privacy included a woman's decision on whether to terminate her pregnancy.ld. at 153.
Because this was a fundamental right, any state regulations must be justified by a compelling state interest. rd. at 153-55. The state interests identified by the Court were protection of a woman's health and protection of the potential life of the fetus. rd. at 154.
These interests, balanced against the woman's right of privacy, were found to be lea
than compelling. rd. at 163-64.
44. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). This case involved a Mi880uri statute which called for a w0man's informed consent, certain recordkeeping requirementl, and parental consent for
minor women.
45. rd. at 74.
46. Id. The Court did not discU88 how this broader authority of the state could be
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the right of minor women to have abortions can be regulated
there must be a significant state interest." Safeguarding the
family unit and reinforcing parental authority were not, according to the Court, interests served by providing a parent with an
absolute veto. In addition, parental authority would not be enhanced by requiring parental consent!·
In a companion case to Danforth, Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti
1),49 the Court considered a Massachusetts statute requiring either parental consent or a court order before a physician could
perform an abortion on a minor woman. The Court indicated
that it might accept as constitutional some parental involvement. IIO However, the case was remanded to the Massachusetts
Supreme Court for further interpretation of the statute.II1 In
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II),n the lower court's decision that
the statute was unconstitutional was upheld in a plurality opinion by Justice Powell. The Court noted: "[T]he tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty. . . . Legal restrictions on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding."" The
Court, however, distinguished the decision of a minor woman to
seek an abortion from other decisions made during minority."
Although parental deference might be permitted when other
exercised constitutionally.
47. Id. at 75. The Court did not state explicitly what a significant state interest
involves, or whether the test for state interference was as strict as the test used when a
compelling state interest is involved.
48. Id. This statement reflects the court's awareneBB of the conflicts which may occur when a minor woman and her parents so disagree that the woman does not wish to
inform her parents of the decision to terminate her pregnancy.
49. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
50. See id. at 147.
51. Id. at 146·52. The Court found the statute could have various constructions,
even though it was argued by the state that the parental consent requirement did not
create the kind of absolute veto held to be unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The M888achusetts Supreme Judicial Court was instructed
to rule on the meaning of the statute, and the District Court was to decide the constitutionality of the statute once the Judicial Court had ruled.
52. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). After the M888achusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the statute, the District Court again declared it unconstitutional.
53. Id. at 638·39.
54. Id. at 642. The decision to seek an abortion differs for example from the decision
to marry before reaching majority. A minor can postpone her decision to marry, but she
cannot postpone her decision to have an abortion.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 3

590

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:579

choices face a minor woman, the "unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision" made it inappropriate to give
parents an absolute veto over the minor's abortion decision. 1I1I
The Court held that where a state requires parental consent
for a minor woman to obtain an abortion, an alternative procedure by which an abortion can be authorized must also be provided. lle The challenged statute was found to fall short of this
constitutional standard because it did not allow every minor woman access to an alternative proceeding. In addition, the statute
permitted the withholding of judicial authorization from a minor
who was found to be mature and fully competent to make an
abortion decision. II'
Thus, the Court in Danforth and Bellotti 11 established that
a minor woman has a fundamental right of privacy, but also indicated that a state has greater latitude in regulating this right
than it has with adults." These two cases did not specify
whether state interference with the right of minor women is subject to the same scrutiny by the Court as is true in cases involving adults. It has been asserted that "a significant state interest"
is a less stringent standard than the compelling state interest
required in Roe. a. It is apparent from Bellotti I and Bellotti 11
that the Court will permit some parental involvement provided
it does not constitute an absolute veto. How far a state can go in
regulating a minor woman's right to privacy is not clear.
55. Id. at 643 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74).
56. 443 U.S. at 643. The purpose of such a proceeding would be for the minor wo-

man to show that she was mature and sufficiently well-informed to make a decision regarding an abortion independent of parental wishet and that, even if she was found to be
immature, the abortion would be in her best interests.
The mature minor concept is applicable in many medical situationa and "supports
the competence of a minor to consent to [her) own health care when sufficiently mature
to understand the benefits and risks of the propoaed treatment." BUR&\u 0' COMMUNITY
HEALTH SERV., PUBLIC HEALTH SBRV., HBALTH SOY. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T 0' HEW, ADoLESCENT HBALTH CARE: A GUiDB 'OR BCHS,SupPORTBD PROGRAMS AND pROJBCTS 61-62
(1979). [hereinafter cited as ADOLESCBNT HEALTH CARlI).
57. 443 U.S. at 646·51.
58. In Danforth, the Court recognized the state's authority to regulate some activi·
ties of minors. 428 U.S. at 74. In Bellotti II, the state's authority was reaffirmed. 443
U.S. at 642.
59. Note, Parental Notice Statutes: Permissible Regulation of a Minor's Abortion
Decision, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (1980) (arguing that parental notification statutes do
not burden a minor woman's right of privacy and that significant state interests are protected by such statutes).
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III. H.L. v. MATHESON
The issue of the constitutionality of parental notice statutes
remains unresolved. A number of statutes requiring a physician
to notify a minor woman's parents before performing an abortion have either been struck down or enjoined by lower federal
courts.60 Although these statutes were found unconstitutional,
similar statutes remain in some states,6J while other legislatures
60. Recently, three federal courts have found such statutes unconstitutional. Leigh
v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181
(E.D. La. 1980); Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542 (D. Me.
1979). A Louisiana statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 provided in part:
No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon an unmarried pregnant woman under the age of eighteen without
first having given at least twenty-four hours actual notice to
one of the parents or the legal guardian of the minor pregnant
woman as to the' intention to perform such abortion.
(Amended 1980) (West Supp.. 1982). The district court found the statute imposed an
"undue burden upon the right to obtain an abortion of unmarried women between the
ages of fifteen and seventeen." Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
The Louisiana statute had a separate provision for women under 15: They could either
obtain a court order for an abortion without notifying a parent, or obtain parental consent. "Apparently, the State determined that a minor woman between the ages of fifteen
and seventeen is mature enough to make the decision whether to obtain an abortion
without the necessity of either parental consent or a court order." rd. at 204. The court
found the Louisiana legislature had not considered a minor woman's constitutional right
of privacy and that the statute might have "a chilling effect on the minor's right to
independently make certain kinds of important decisions which are the basis of a woman's constitutional righ~ to obtain an abortion." rd.
In Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542 (D. Me. 1979),
the district court preliminarily enjoined a Maine Statute, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
1597 (1980) which provides in part: "A person shall not perform an abortion on an unemancipated minor without first giving notice to one of her parents or guardians of his
intention to perform that abortion or notifying the Department of Human Services of his
inability to give notice." As in the decision reached by the Louisiana district court, the
Maine court relied on Bellotti 11, in finding that the statute had a substantial probability
of being found unconstitutional. The court was convinced by affidavits "showing that in
some instances the involvement of parents in a minor's abortion decision will be harmful
to both the minor and the family relationshiip." 477 F. Supp. at 547.
A North Dakota statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1) (1981) (amended 1981)
(Interim Supp. 1981) outlawing abortions for unemancipated minors without 24 hour
actual notice was found unconstitutional in Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D.
1980). This court, also relying on Bellotti II, held the statute's requirement of a parental
notification in every case constituted an undue burden on the exercise of a minor woman's right to obtain an abortion. 497 F. Supp. at 1349-50.
61. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135(d) (1980) provides in part:
[NJo abortion shall be performed upon an unmarried minor
female without prior notification of parent or guardian, unless
the minor is living apart from her parent or guardian and a
reasonable effort to notify them has been unsuccessful. A receipt that a registered or certified letter was mailed attached
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have refused to pass parental notification statutes.1I Additionally, a bill now before Congress would require parental notification before hospitals and clinics would be eligible for federal
funds. 88 Resolution of the situation was expected when the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to a Utah parental notification statute. This statute, upheld by the Utah Supreme
Court, was challenged as an unconstitutional burden on a minor
woman's right to an abortion."
However, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
H.L. v. Matheson 81 only resolved the narrow issue of parental
notification as it affects unemancipated minor women who make
no claim as to maturity to give informed consent. The statute
had been challenged as overbroad because it could apply to all
unmarried minor women." Chief Justice Burger, writing the
plurality opinion, stated that because the appellant lacked
standing, it was not necessary to decide the question of the statto a copy of the notice letter sent such parent . . . at his or
her last known address shall be conclusive evidence of notice
or attempted notice required by this subsection.
See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-5-616 (Spec. Supp. 1977) ("No abortion may be performed upon any woman in the absence of. . . the written notice to a parent, if living, or
the custodian or legal guardian of such woman, if she is under eighteen (18) years of ap
and unmarried."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76·7·304 (1978) ("To enable the physician to ner·
cise his beat medical judgment, he shall ... notify, if poIIIIible, the parents or guardian
of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if ahe is a minor.").
62. See infra notes 82 and 83.
63. S. 1808, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (The Family Protection Act). The stated
purpose of the Act is to "strengthen the American family and promote the virtues of
family life through education, tax assistance, and related measures." The Act provides in
part:
No program, project, or entity shall receive Federal funds, ei·
ther directly or indirectly, under any provisions of law unless
such program, project, or entity, prior to providing any contra·
ceptive device or abortion service (including abortion counsel·
ing) to an unmarried minor, notifies the parents or guardians
of such minor that such contraceptives are being provided.
The Reagan administration has also drafted proposals requiring family Plannini
clinics that receive federal funda to notify parents within ten days of a minor woman
receiving prescription birth control devices. S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 20, 1982, at 7, col. 1.
64. H.L. v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah S. Ct. 1979). The Utah Supreme Court
concluded that encouraging a minor to seek the advice of her parents promoted a signifi·
cant state interest in supporting the important role of parents in child·rearing. Id. at
912.
65. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
66. ld. at 405. The appellant had contended that the Utah statute could be COD·
strued as applying to mature and emancipated minor women.
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ute's constitutionality as applied to mature or emancipated minor women. S? The only issue before the Court, according to Justice Burger, was the constitutionality of the statute requiring
parental notification, "when the girl is living with and dependent upon her parents, ' , , when she is not emancipated by
marriage or otherwise, and , , , when she has made no claim or
showing as to her maturity or as to her relations with her parents,"68 With the issue narrowed to only unemancipated and immature minors, the Chief Justice concluded the statute served
the significant state interests of protecting family integrity and
protecting minors:·'
That the requirement of notice to parents may inhibit some minors from seeking abortions is not a
valid basis to void the statute as applied to appellant and the class properly before us. The Constitution does not compel a State to fine-tune its
statutes 80 as to encourage or facilitate
abortions. 70

Justices Powell and Stewart joined the plurality opinion "on
the understanding that it leaves open the question whether [the
statute] unconstitutionally burdens the right of a mature minor
or a minor whose best interests would not be served by parental
notification."?l Justice Powell concluded that a state may not
validly require notice to parents in all cases,
without providing an independent decision-maker
to whom a pregnant minor can have recourse if
she believes that she is mature enough to make
the abortion decision independently or that notification otherwise would not be in her best interest. . . . The circumstances relevant to the abor67. "[T)he trial court found that appellant 'is unmarried, fifteen years of age, resides at home and is a dependent of her parents.' That affords an insufficient basis for a
finding that she is either mature or emancipated." 1d. at 406.
68. 1d. at 407.
69. 1d. at 411. The Court stated the statute "plainly serves the important consideration of family integrity and protecting adolescents which we identified in Bellotti 11." 1d.
(footnotes omitted). The Court also found the statute served a significant state interest
by providing an opportunity for parents to supply a physician with essential medical
information about the minor woman.
70. 1d. at 413. The Court cited Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 291, 325 (1980): "[S)tate
action 'encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances' is 'rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life.' " 450 U.S. at
413.
71. [d. at 414.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 3

594

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:579

tion decision by a minor can and do vary so
substantially that absolute rules-requiring parental notification in all cases or in none-would
create an inBexibility that often would allow no
consideration of the rights and interests [of the
state, parents or minorJ.71

Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but declined to
join the opinion. He believed the Court had a duty to answer the
broader question of the statute's constitutionality as applied to
all minor women.'8 On that question, Justice Stevens asserted
that a parental notice requirement would be justified in all
cases. He based his opinion on a state's interest in protecting a
"young pregnant woman from the consequences of an incorrect
abortion decision. "74
Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, and found the plurality opinion too narrow. Justice
Marshall disagreed that appellant lacked sufficient standing to
challenge the Utah statute.7& He concluded that appellant did
have standing and examined the statute to see if parental notification placed any burdens on the minor woman's abortion decision. He noted, "[t]he ideal of a supportive family so pervades
our culture that it may seem incongruous to examine 'burdens'
imposed by a statute requiring parental notice of a minor daughter's decision to terminate her pregnancy."" However, he acknowledged that many minor women would encounter interference from their parents after their notification. 77 The hardship
created for these women'8 would be the result of a "state-imposed obstacle to the exercise of . . . free choice."71 The Utah
72. Id. at 420.
73. Id. at 421.
74. Id. at 422-25.
75. Id. at 426.
76. Id. at 436-37. Justice Marshall stated that realistically many families do not live
up to this ideal of the supportive family and that parental notification effectively would
cancel a minor woman's right to avoid disclosure of her personal choice.
77. Id. at 437. "Many minors, like appellant, oppose parental notice and seek instead to preserve the fundamental personal right to privacy. It is for these minors that
the parental notification requirement creates a problem." ld.
78. ld. at 438-39. "Many minor women will encounter interference from their parents after the state-imposed notification. In addition to parental disappointment and

disapproval, the minor may confront physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial
support, or actual obstruction of the abortion decision." Id. at 439.
79. Id. at 441. Justice Marshall noted that the state-created obstacle did not operate
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statute "unquestionably" burdened a minor woman's right of
privacy, and none of the reasons offered by the state justified
infringement upon this right. 80 He stated the "Court must join
the state courts and legislatures which have acknowledged the
undoubted social reality: Some minors, in some circumstances,
have the capacity and the need to determine their health care
needs without involving their parents. "81
The Court's ruling in Matheson is very narrow and has not
resolved the issue of the constitutionality of parental notification
statutes as applied to minor women who are mature enough to
make the abortion decision independent of their parents. Three
Justices upheld the constitutionality of parental notification requirements for unemancipated and immature minor women, and
one Justice found such requirements were not unconstitutional
for any minor women. In addition, two members of the plurality
expressed the opinion that a state must provide access to an independent decision-maker so that mature minor women have an
alternative to notifying their parents.
The lack of a definitive ruling from the Court will create
confusion not only for state legislatures and lower courts, but
also for those minor women who are subject to a variety of differing regulations. 811
in a neutral fashion. Because notice was not required for other pregnancy related medi-

cal care, only minor women who sought abortions encountered the burden imposed by
the notification statute.
SO. Id. at 446. Justice Marshall concluded that even if the state's purpose in encouraging consultation between the minor woman and her parents was legitimate, the statute
failed to advance the asserted goal. "Parental consultation hardly seems a legitimate
state purpose where the minor's pregnancy resulted from incest, where a hostile or abusive parental response is assured, or where the minor's fear of such a response deters her
from the abortion she desires." Id.
81. Id. at 453.
82. Since the Court ruling in Matheson, four states have enacted parental notification statutes attempting to conform to Matheson. See 1981 Minn. Seas. Law Serv. cb.
228 (West) (amending MINN. STAT. § 144.343), providing in part: "[N)o abortion operation shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor or upon a woman for whom a
guardian or conservator has been appointed . . . until at least 48 hours after written
notice of the pending operation." This statute also has an alternative provision providing
for the possibility of one section being held invalid or enjoined. The alternative provision
would provide a minor woman with a judicial proceeding if she elects not to allow notification of her parents. No. REv. STAT. § 28-347 (Supp. 1981) provides for 24-hour notice
to parents prior to an abortion for a minor woman, but also provides that:
The district court or any judge thereof in the county in which
the minor resides or the abortion is to be performed or, in the
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In Matheson, the Court affirmed that the state interest in
requiring parental notification must be significant to permit infringement on a minor woman's right to privacy. The Court
found the state's interests did outweigh an unemancipated minor woman's right. The question of what state interests are
served by requiring parental notification is central to any analysis of this area.
One identified state interest in regulating a minor woman's
access to an abortion is protection of the woman's health.II Another is protection and promotion of family integrity and parental authority." Parental notification requirements do not appear
absence from the county of such district judge the county
court or a judge thereof, shall, upon it appearing satisfactorily
to the court or judge by the affidavit or testimony of the petitioning minor that the minor is mature enough to make the
abortion decision independently or that notification would not
be in the minor's best interests, waive the notice requirements
of . . . this section.
NBV. RBV. STAT. § 442-255 (1981) provides in part: "A person shall not knowingly perform an abortion upon an unmarried and unemancipated woman who is under the age of
eighteen years unless he notifies a parent or guardian of the woman at least 24 hours
before the abortion, if it is possible to notify the parent or guardian." R.I. GEN. LAws I
23-4.7-3.1 (Supp. 1981) provides: "In the C888 of a pregnant minor, the phyaiciaD ahall
exercise reasonable diligence to notify the parent or legal guardian of the minor prior to
performing the abortion, if feasible and practicable."
The Minnesota and Nebraska statutes appear to be a direct response to the Sugplltion by Justice Powell in Matheson that a state may not validly require notice to parente
in all C8888 without providing an independent decision-maker. See 450 U.S. at 420.
83. The California Legislature rejected a bill which would have required parental
notice. The purpose of this bill was stated in terlDl of protecting a minor woman's
health:
The Legislature also finds that abortion is associated with an
increased risk of complication in subsequent pregnancies, that
the medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an
abortion are serious and can be lasting, and that the emotional
and psychological effects of the pregnancy and abortion experience are markedly more severe in girls under 18 than in
adults. The Legislature further finds that, if the pregnant girl
elects to carry her child to term, the medical decisions to be
made entail few-perhaps none-of the potentially grave emotional and psychological consequenc:el of the deciaion to abort.
S. 154, 1981-82 Reg. Seas. (Cal. 1981). The bill originally included parental consent provisions which were eliminated. S. 154 died in committee.
84. The other stated purpose of the proposed California parental notification statute
was protection of family integrity and unity:
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to serve or protect these interests when balanced against the mi-

nor woman's interests. The state's interest in the minor woman's
health is, in fact, not served by requiring parental notification
because, as noted earlier, parental notification can have extremely detrimental effects on a minor woman's psychological
health.slI
The Court has recognized that states have a valid interest in
protecting and promoting family integrity and parental authority." However, the Court has recognized that parental authority
cannot be absolute.S? Although it might appear that encouraging
a minor woman to consult her parents would, in many cases,
promote family harmony, this would not be true in all cases.
Where a minor woman and her parents disagree regarding her
sexual activity, a requirement that the parents be informed of
the possibility of abortion will do very little to promote family
.
unity and harmony.88
The Legislature. furthermore, finds that enhancing the poten. tial for parental consultation concerning the abortion decision
with its potentially traumatic and permanent consequences, is
reasonably calculated to protect minors and thus furthers a
constitutionally permissible end. The Legislature finds that
this enhancement also plainly serves the important considerations for family integrity and advances the constitutionally
protected relationship between parents and child, including
the parents' claim to authority in their own household, to direct the rearing of their children, and the parents' important
guiding role in the upbringing of their children, which U\cludes
counseling them on important decisions.
[d.

85. See supra note 35.
86. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.s. 158
(1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
87. A parental veto was seen by the Court in Danforth as an impermissible exercile
of parental authority:
It is difficult, however. to conclude that providing a parent
with absolute power to overrule a determination, made by the
physician and his minor patient, to terminate the patiant's
pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is
it likely that such veto power will enhance parental authority
or control where the minor and the non-consenting parent are
80 fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the
pregnancy already has fractured the family structure.
428 U.S. at 75.
88. "[A]ny state interest in encouraging consultation between the daughter who is
seeking an abortion and her parents is not necesaarily achieved by the notice requIrement because merely giving notice to the parents does not asaure that there will be any
meaningful dialogue." Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 204 (E.D. La. 1980).
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Parental notification is based, in part, on the assumption
that once a minor woman's parents have been notified, the woman and her parents will rationally discuss her decision to obtain an abortion. As a result of this dialogue, the parents and the
minor woman will make a decision that is ostensibly in the best
interests of the daughter." But when a minor woman has decided to seek an abortion without her parents' knowledge, this
discussion may not take place, or if it does, may result in a decision that is not in the minor woman's best interests. It may result instead in family argument and strife. eo The state, therefore,
rather than promoting and protecting family integrity, would be
contributing to the already existing strife. The state interest in
safeguarding the family, in this situation, is clearly outweighed
by the minor woman's right of privacy.
An underlying state interest in requiring parental notifica-

tion is prevention of teenage sexual activity and teenage
pregnancies.·1 This interest reBects a concern for preserving certain moral values regarding pre-marital sexual activity." The
belief that the rise in teenage sexual activity is due to accessible
abortion appears to be one motivating factor behind abortion
regulation." However, teenage sexual activity and access to
abortions do not correlate.N Exact reasons behind the increase
89. "Ostensibly, the notice requirement furthers the Statea' interest in insuring that
parents are given the opportunity to participate in an important and potentially traumatic decision in the life of their minor daughter, thus promoting family dialogue and
harmony." ld.
90. It is unrealistic •.. to asaume that [a supporting and understanding) intra-family relationship exists in every caae, and where such a
relationship does not exist, the required notification is leas likely to
result in an objective determination as to whether the minor is mature and well enough informed to make an intelligent abortion
decision.
Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1350 (D.N.D. 1980).
91. This interest is one which is promoted strongly by interest groups who feel that
aCC88B to abortion and contraceptives, as well as sex education, is responsible for the rise
in minors' sexual activity. "Members of the Moral Majority believe that stringent legislation limiting minors' rights to privacy will be an effective method of controlling and
deterring sexuality: if birth control and abortion are not readily available, the teenagers
will think twice about reckl888 sexual behavior." Meyers, Ilupra note I, at 20.
92. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Justice Brennan was
unpersuaded that there Wall a significant lltate interest in promoting a policy of discouraging sexual activity among minors by prohibiting aCC888 to contraceptives.
93. See supra note 91.
94. In 1973, Roe struck down lltate laws outlawing abortion except to save a woman's life. Danforth extended the right to decide whether or not to bear a child to mi-
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in teenage sexual activity are unknown. It has been postulated
that the age of sexual maturation has dropped significantly, resulting in teenagers becoming sexually active at earlier ages. 'II
Requiring parental notification will not significantly affect this
increase in sexual activity: "The imposition of parental consent
or notification would not impel all young adolescents to tell their
parents about their decision . . . to have an abortion, or to stop
having seL""
Another interest served by required parental notice is prevention of abortions. This interest appears to be intertwined
with that of preserving moral values. Opposition to abortion is
never explicitly stated as a reason for parental notification legislation; most statutes have protection of the family, in some
form, as a stated purpose.'" However, opposition to abortion is
the primary interest served by such statutes.
For some groups, abortion represents the taking of innocent
life; others view motherhood as a woman's primary role, and
pregnancy as an honor for which women are chosen.'s Women
who reject this "honor," either by remaining childless or by terminating a pregnancy, are seen as a threat to the status quo."
nors in 1976. Between 1961 and 1974, out·of-wedlock births for 14- to 17-year-olds increased 75%. 11 MILLION 'ruNAGIRS, '"pro note 26, at 13. The significance of this
increase is that it occurred before abortion became legally available to minor women.
95. "Without question, early coitus is closely associated with early biologic development. Acceleration of sexual development and behavior has occurred at the same time as
a relaxation of aocietal standards." AooLB8CBNT HIw.TH CARB supra note 56, at 33.
Not only are minors maturing usually at an earlier age, but they are also the target
of advertising campaigns suggesting that to be attractive and popular, they should be
sexy. A recent development in this campaign has been the use of post-pubescent young
women in place of adult women for advertisement of jeans, cosmetics, perfumes and high
fashion.
96. Torres, Forrest & Eisman, '"pro note 30, at 291.
97. Many statutes use protection of the family or protection of the parent-child relationship 811 a basis for requiring parental notice. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-51
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981) (enacted to support rights and responsibilities of parents); UTAH CODB ANN. I 76-7-304 (1978) (found in Criminal Code under Offenses
Against the Family). See 0160 '"pro note 84.
98. "An important corollary of the right to life argument was its implications of the
role and responsibility of women as mothers"; women are expected to make the required
sacrifices for childbearing and 8 woman's primary responsibility is to carry a pregnancy
to term. A. STBINHOFf & M. DIAMOND, ABORTION POLITICS: THB HAWAII EXPERIENCE 10610 (1977). "Childbirth has nowhere been regarded merely as one possible event in a woman's life." Rich, The Theft of Childbirth, in SEIZING OUR BODIES: THE POLmcs Or
WOMEN'S HEALTH 146 (C. Dreifus ed. 1977).
99. "The value of a woman's Ufe would appear to be contingent on her being preg-
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These women have refused to accept their culturally imposed
role to bear children and continue the species. loo Much antiabortion sentfment is also combined with religious fundamentalism as abortion is believed to be a major sign of moral permissiveness. 10I Groups opposed to abortion, therefore, focus on either overturning the Supreme Court's decision in Roe or
lobbying for legislation limiting access to abortion. lOll Recent
federal legislation limiting access to abortion reflects this bias. loa
Congressmen who openly oppose abortion l 0.4 have introduced
nant or newly delivered. Women who refuse to become mothers are not merely emotionally suspect, they are dangerous." Rich, supra note 97, at 148.
100. [d.
10l. "A new and frightening factor has been added to the politics of abortion. This

is the powerful movement of fundamentalists into the antiabortion cause." Simmons,
Fundamentalism and Abortion Politics, 4 PLANNED PARENTHOOD REV. 12 (1981). Fundamentalism is a form of religious zeal whose followers see themselves as acting to save the
world from moral decline. Some leaders of the fundamentalist movement have aligned
themselves with ultra·conservative politicians and groups to form the Christian Right.
The result is the formation of groups such as the Moral Majority founded and led by the
Reverend Jerry Falwell, a Baptist from Virginia, whose primary goal is to ban abortion.
The movement also includes the Christian Voice, a California· based group whose board
includes Senators Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah), James McClure (R.-Idaho), Roger Jepsen
(R.-Iowa) and Gordon Humphrey (R.-N.H.). [d.
102. Legislation has been introduced in Congress aimed at overturning Roe. See
supra note 17. The Human Life Statute would do what the Court in Roe expressly refused to do: Declare that the word "person" in the fourteenth amendment includes the
unborn and allow states to prosecute abortion as murder. This legislation has the support of the National Right to Life Committee, the largest antiabortion organization. The
Human Life Federalism amendment, which would authorize Congress and the states to
prohibit or regulate abortion, was introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah and has
the backing of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Donovan, Half a Loaf: A
New Antiabortion Strategy, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 262 (1981).
103. See supra note 13.
104. When the Human Life Federalism amendment was introduced in the House of
Representatives by Representative Ashbrook (R.-Ohio), he stated:
For far too long, the people of this country have been frustrated in their efforts to petition their government for a redreBS of grievances in this matter [abortion). The CQurts have
consistently struck down moat legislative efforts to limit or
even regulate abortion. Spousal and parental conllent requirements are virtually nonexistent, and in most instances, minor
daughters can obtain abortions even without parental
knowledge.
What we have in this country today is nothing less than
runaway, wide-open abortion-on-demand. There are no real
restrictions on the so-called right to abortion that was created
in the Supreme Court's 1973 decision.
H.R.J. Res. 372, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONGo REc. 9407·9, 9408 (daily ed. Dec. 11,
1981).
Representative Henry J. Hyde (R.-lll.), who introduced the Human Life Statute, is
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bills reflecting this viewpoint. Antiabortion and fundamentalist
groups have also applied substantial pressure on state and federal officials in legislative hearings and elections.··
As the rate of teenage pregnancy climbs, antiabortion and
fundamentalist groups point to access to abortion as a major
cause of this increase.·· Requiring parental notice is viewed as a
method of preventing reckless teenage sexual activity.·.., As
vocal in his opposition to abortion and repreaents antiabortion interests In Congress.
Q Repreaentative Hyde, why are you in favor of outlawiDi
abortion?
A Because abortion is the kIIlinI or an innocently inconvenient human ure . . .•
Q Shouldn't a woman have a right to decide tbia question for
herself?
A No. Neither a woman nor a man should have the right to
kill another human bein,. The fetus or embryo in the woman
is a separate human hein, with Ita own blood-circulation ayatem and brain waves.

Should Abortions Be Outlawed? Interview witla RepreMntatiue Henry J. Hyde,
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 1981, at 31.

U.s.

Other Congressmen openly oppoeed to abortion include, Senators Jeremiah Dent.oD
(R.-Ala.), Don Nickles (R.-Okla.) and Rudy Boecbwita (R.-Minn.), co-spoDIOn of the
Human Life Federalism amendment, and Senator .I... Helma (R.-N.C.), co-sponaor 01
the Human Life statute.
105. Tactics employed by antiabortion and fundamentalist grouP' include: Use of
public forums featuring expert speakers qainat abortion, opinion polla, use or the media
by interviews and publication of advertiaementa, letter writinc campaigns, IDUI demonstrations showing pictures of fetal development, and lobbyina efforts with legislaton. A.
Steinhoff & M. Diamond, supra note 98, at 36-59.
By joiniq forces with fundamentalist grouP' and conservative politicians, antiabortion groups have been able to raise larp suma or money to inc:reue their influence upon
elections. Political action committees such u Senator J .... Helma' National Conpessional Club raised $7.9 million in the 1979-80 election year and spent ".6 million to
support the presidential bid of Ronald Reagan. The National Conservative Political Action Committee raised $7.6 million and spent ts.2 million, much or It for negative advertisin, aimed at defeatinc liberal senaton. S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 21, 1982, at 2, col. 3.
The 1980 elections reflected the increased efforts or antiabortionista to OUit prochoice candidates from office.
The 97th Congress Is considerably more conservative--and
more opposed to legal abortion-than Ita predeceaaor, with the
Republicans having gained control of the Senate. Moreover,
prochoice Democrats such as John Culver (Iowa), Warren
Magnuson (Wash.)j George McGovern (S.Dak.) and Birch
Bayh have been replaced in the Senate by such New Right
and antiabortion activist Republicans .. John East (N.C.),
Charles Grassley (Iowa), Don Nicldea and Jeremiah Denton.
Donovan, supra note 101, at 265.
106. See supra note 91.
107. Id.
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noted above, parental notice will not significantly deter sexual
activity. lOS It will, however, have a significant impact on a minor
woman's access to an abortion. Parental intervention resulting
from notification may prevent some minor women from obtaining abortions. loe Additionally, fear of parental notification
may prevent many other minor women from seeking abortions. l1 ° This fear is a major reason minor women delay seeking
an abortion. 111 It is the contention of this author that preventing
or limiting access to abortion will be the singular effect of requiring parental notice.
V. CONCLUSION
At present, a state can require parental consent if it provides a judicial process as an alternative to consent. 11I A state
can also require parental notification for a minor woman who is
unemancipated or is not mature enough to make an abortion decision independently.ua The Court in Matheson failed to decide
the constitutionality of parental notification for mature minor
women.
This reluctance to find such procedures burdensome on a
minor woman's right of privacy is based on the idea that they do
not affect a minor woman's right to an abortion. The Court is
not willing to address the fact that a parental notification requirement will effectively prevent access to abortion. Many mi108. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text.
110. When asked what they would do if it was required that their parents be notified of their decision to seek an abortion, nine percent of the women surveyed say
that they would have a self-induced or an illegal abortion, another nine percent say they would have the baby, two percent
say that they would leave home and three percent say that
they don't know what they would do. Some of their resPOI18e8
might be considered irrational (for example, having the child
would not prevent their parents from finding out about the
pregnancy). The responses do indicate, however, that a sizeable proportion of teenagers believe that the notification of
their parents would put them in a desperate situation and that
they would be forced to resort to desperate measure. to deal
with it.
Torres, Forrest & Eisman, supra note 30, at 288.
111. Jd.

112. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 113 (1979).
113. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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nor women will be unable to obtain an abortion after their parents have been notified. As noted by Justice Marshall in
Matheson, such notification requirements are based on the ideal
of a supportive family. However, many families do not live up to
this ideal. 114
The Matheson decision also leaves lower courts and state
legislatures with no significant guidelines 1111 as the members of
the plurality opinion expressed different opinions on the constitutionality of parental notification requirements for mature minors. The issue needs to be resolved; until it is, minor women
will be subject to many differing and confusing regulations when
they seek to obtain an abortion.
Parental notification statutes place an undue burden on a
minor woman's right of privacy. They do not serve any significant state interest inasmuch as the parent-child relationship and
family harmony are not enhanced by such restrictive laws. When
a minor woman is in conflict with her parents regarding her sexual activity, notifying the parents of the decision to have an
abortion will most often increase family strife. The minor woman's mental or physical health is, therefore, not protected.
Such a result affects the minor woman's right of privacy. This
fundamental right is precisely that which notification statutes
seek to abrogate.
Opposition to abortion per se should be recognized as the
underlying reason for parental notice requirements. The courts
must look beyond the stated interests and recognize that arguments premised on protection of the family and family values
are used by antiabortion forces to restrict access to abortion.
Only by a thorough examination of the interests served by parental notification statutes can courts decide the constitutionality of such statutes. The courts must engage in this examination
to preserve the right of privacy established in Danforth and
Bellotti.
Susan A. Bush

114. [d. at 436.
115. See supra note 82.
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